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CONUNDRUMS UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-A REPLY
TO PROFESSOR WHITE
ROBERT F. T. DUGAN*
One of the few remaining controversies regarding Article 3 con-
cerns the creation, transfer, and significance of "holder" status.' Al-
though holder status is clearly a prerequisite for valid indorsement, 2
effective discharge,' certain procedural advantages,' and for protection
against many defenses,' scholars continue to debate its proper role
under the Code in several unusual factual situations.' Problems aris-
ing from these situations include the effects of conversion of certain
types of negotiable instruments upon the holder status of subsequent
transferees, the role of holder status in determining the consequences
of alteration, and the creation and transfer of holder status in situa-
tions involving double forgeries. This article reviews past analysis of
these conundrums and suggests that the difficulties should be attributed
* B.A., Stanford University, 1963; J.D., University of Chicago, 1967; MA., Stanford,
1964; M.C.L., University of Chicago, 1969; Member of the Minnesota Bar; Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
1 See White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1315
(1967) ; Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185,
192-94 (1967) ; Palizzi, Forgeries and Double Forgeries Under Articles 3 and 4 of the
U.C.C., 42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 659 (1969); Comment, The Concept Of Holder In Due
Course In Article III Of The Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1573, 1574
(1968) ; Comment, Commercial Transactions; Can a Thief Be a "Holder"? 19 Okla. L.
Rev. 179 (1966).
2 U.C.C. § 3-202(2). (Ali citations to the Uniform Commercial Code in this article
will be to the 1962 Official Text unless otherwise indicated.]
8 See, e.g., U.C.C. NI 3-603(1), 3-604(1).
4 U.C.C. § 3-307(2). For an extensive discussion of this point see Kinyon, Actions
on Commercial Paper: Holder's Procedural Advantages Under Article Three, 65 Mich.
L. Rev, 1441 (1967).
5 U.C.C. 1 3-305.
0
 See, e.g., R. SpeldeI, R. Summers & J. White, Commercial Transactions Teaching
Materials 1027-28 (1969).
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not to drafters' ineptitude, but rather, to an incomplete or faulty inter-
pretation of the relevant Code sections. The arguments and proposals
presented here are intended principally as a reply to Professor J.
White,1 who was apparently the first to consider these issues in the
context of Article 3 and whose analysis has been accepted widely and,
perhaps, too uncritically.
I. EFFECTS OF CONVERSION UPON THE "HOLDER" STATUS
OF SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREES OF BEARER PAPER
AND INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE TO THE
THIEF'S ORDER
The first and most frequently discussed conundrum arises in con-
nection with indorsements forged upon stolen instruments. Consider
two demand notes drawn by Able: 8 the first payable to bearer, the
second payable to the order of Baker. Baker steals both instruments
from Able's desk, indorses the second instrument with his own name,
and delivers them to Donald. Assume, further, that Donald complies
with the requirements of holder in due course status under 3-302
(1) and receives the instrument in good faith, gives value and is with-
out notice of the conversion. In his suit against Able, Donald will in-
voke the maker's duties under section 3-413 (1) 9 and will seek to
enforce them by use of the Article 3 recovery norm, section 3-307(2):
When signatures are admitted or established, production of
the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the
defendant [the maker] establishes a defense ° (emphasis
added).
As this section demonstrates, holder status is a necessary element
in Donald's case."
The Code contains two provisions relevant to the acquisition of
holder status as regards negotiable instruments. The definition of
I See White, supra note 1, at 1316-29.
8 For a discussion of the problems arising from the theft of such instruments, see
White, supra note 1, at 1317; Comment, supra note 1, 19 Okla. L. Rev. 179, 180 (1966);
Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
D See U.C.C. § 3-413(1): "The maker . . . engages that be will pay the instrument
according to its tenor at the time of his engagement .. .."
10 Although U.C.C. § 3-307(2) is generally deemed to be a procedural norm, it is
possible to view it as the counterpart to 1 2-703 (seller's remedies) and 2-711 (buyer's
remedies) in the same sense that § 3-413 (contract of maker, drawer and acceptor) and
3-414 (contract of indorser) are the counterparts of § 2-301 (general obligations of
buyer and seller). Quite apart from procedural problems, it is often useful to distinguish
between norms which set forth obligations and those which set forth the prerequisites for
breach of those obligations.
11 See U.C.C. 1 3-307, Comment 2.
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bolder in section 1-201(20) applies primarily to determine the holder
status of the first transferee of the instrument:
Holder means a person who is in possession of . . . an instru-
ment . . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or
to bearer or in blank.
In contrast, section 3-202 (1) provides an alternative means to establish
the holder status of a subsequent transferee:
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such a form
that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is
payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any neces-
sary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by
delivery.
Recovery on the bearer note poses no problems with respect to the
holder element.' 2 Donald qualifies as a holder under section 1-201(20)
because he is in possession of a note drawn to bearer. He also qualifies
under section 3-202(1) since bearer paper is negotiated by delivery
and since negotiation converts the transferee into a holder. Whether or
not Donald also becomes the "owner" of the note is irrelevant, for any
residual ownership claims will be severed when Donald's holder status
is combined with his good faith, lack of notice, and having parted with
value."
Recovery on the second note is more troublesome!' That note was
payable to the order of Baker who stole the instrument from the maker,
Able. Once again, Donald must satisfy the holder requirement of section
3-307(2) in order to recover. In the case of order paper, Donald's
holder status depends upon Baker's subsequent indorsement. Under
the section 1-201(20) definition of holder, however, Donald must
demonstrate that he is in possession of an instrument indorsed to his
order or in blank. Similarly, section 3-202(1) affords holder status as
a result of negotiation that also depends upon indorsement." Not
surprisingly, the question unavoidably arises as to whether Baker's sig-
nature constitutes an indorsement for purposes of those two sections.
It is at this point that Baker's own status as a holder becomes
52
 Because § 3-207(2) gives to the maker the right of rescission of negotiation except
against subsequent holders in due course, it is crucial for the transferee to become a
holder in due course in order to sever the residual claims of the owner, Able.
53 See U.C.C. I 3-308(1).
54
 See discussion in White, supra note 1, at 1318-28; Comment, 19 Okla. L. Rev.
supra note 1, at 181.
za U.C.C. § 3-202(1): "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that
the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary indorsement... ."
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seemingly relevant in light of section 3-202(2), which provides that
"an indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder . . . ."
With some hesitation, commentators, including Professor White, have
interpreted this provision to be the definition of indorsement." They
argue that unless Baker was a holder there can be no valid indorsement
for purposes of sections 1-201(20) and 3-202(1), which determine
Donald's holder status.ii They are thus led, ineluctably, into a debate
over whether a thief can be a holder.
The holder status of the thief (Baker) must, as described above,,
be derived from one or both of the Code's holder provisions, Sections
1-201(20) and 3-202(1). In the case of either bearer or order paper,
Baker cannot acquire holder status pursuant to section 3-202(1). By
virtue of its reference to negotiation, that provision applies only to the
status of transferees subsequent to the issuance of the instrument. Even
if section 3-202(1) applied to the original acquisition of an instrument,
it would still not operate to confer holder status upon Baker since the
note was not delivered to him. For negotiation purposes "delivery,"
as defined in section 1-201(14), is the "voluntary transfer of posses-
sion."18 Baker's status under the general holder definition in section
1-201(20) is less clear; he is required to be in possession of an
instrument "drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order." The
term "drawn" is said to refer only to checks; 19 Baker's lack of holder
status also makes "indorsed" inapplicable in the present context. There-
fore, Baker's holder status seemingly depends upon the meaning of
the term "issued." However, under section 3-102(1) (a), "issue" in-
cludes the element of delivery to a holder. This interpretation produces
a somewhat anomalous result." In our case Baker would be denied
"holder" status since the terms "drawn" and "indorsed" do not describe
his mode of acquisition of the note and since the term "issued" pre-
supposes an element of voluntariness. On the other hand, if the instru-
ment in question were a check21 payable to Baker, the latter would
qualify as a holder since "drawn" does not presuppose delivery and
would accurately describe his mode of acquisition.
The problems raised by an instrument in the form of a note pay-
16 See, e.g., White, supra note 1, at 1327; Mellinkoff, supra note 1, at 192; Palizzi,
supra note 1, at 666.
17 See White, supra note 1, at 1327.
18 In the case of bearer paper, Donald may still be a "holder" even though Baker
is not. Baker can "deliver" the instrument to Donald and § 3-202 only requires "delivery"
as a prerequisite to conferring holder status on the transferee.
19 See White, supra note 1, at 1313.
20 Id.
21 Under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law [hereinafter cited as NIL], the
definition of "holder" precluded this particular anomaly: NIL § 191: "Holder means the
payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."
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able to the thief's order may result not from any looseness in drafting
but rather from infirmities in interpretation. For instance, it is doubtful
whether the terms "issued" and "drawn" as used in section 1-201(20)
were meant to distinguish between a note thief and a check thief. Al-
though the Code may elsewhere distinguish between "drawing" and
"making" and between "drawers" and "makers,"" this does not force
one to conclude that "drawn" in Section 1-201(20) refers only to checks.
The terms "drawn" and "made" are frequently used interchangeably
to describe the composition of instruments." Hence, in the interest of
achieving consistent results in the stolen check and stolen note cases,
the term "drawn" can be extended without difficulty to include notes
in the context of section 1-201(20), and thereby to confer "holder"
status upon the thief."
The proper construction of section 1-201(20) is, however, a minor
point." The far more intriguing question is whether the status of the
thief (Baker) is even material to Donald's claim on the second instru-
ment. The status of Baker becomes important as the result of the
following line of argument: 2° Donald must, to recover under section
3-307(2), show that he is a holder; with respect to the second instru-
ment Donald's status as a holder, whether under section 3-202(1) or
section 1-201(20), depends upon Baker's indorsement; under section
3-202(2) an indorsement can only be made by a holder; therefore, the
status of the thief (Baker) must be examined.
The crucial link in this argument is the interpretation of section
3-202(2):
22 For U.C.C. provisions which establish different substantive obligations for drawers
and makers, see, e.g., I§ 3-122, 3-413. Article 3 is replete with instances where "drawing"
and "making" are used in connection with checks and notes respectively; see also U.C.C.
§§ 3-112(1)(g), 3-118(a), 3-121 (Alternative A), 3-122(3), 3-413(2), 3-412(1), 3-501(1)
(c).
23 U.C.C. §§ 3-205, Comment 1; 3-406, Comment 2; 3-115, 3-117, Comment 1;
3-201, Comment 3; and NIL § 8.
24 The Code elsewhere recognizes that a thief may qualify as a holder. U.C.C.
§ 3-603(1)(a): "This subsection [dealing with discharge by payment to a holder] does
not, however, result in the discharge of the liability (a) of a party who in bad faith pays
or satisfies a holder who acqUired the instrument by theft. . ." (emphasis added).
It has been argued that § 3-305(1) implicitly requires that holder status be attributed
to a thief. Under that section, some holders (those in due course) can take free of
ownership claims attached to the instrument; this would not be possible if delivery were an
element of holder status. See White, supra note 1, at 1318, 1321-22.
25 The term "issued", although referred to in § 1-201(20), raises more problems
than it answers and thus is probably irrelevant to the discussion of Baker's bolder status.
As a matter of common usage in the Code, "issue" refers primarily to documents of title
and investment securities, both of which are also mentioned in § 1-201(20). Furthermore,
since the Article 3 definition of "issue," contained in § 3-102(1)(a), presupposes the notion
of "holder," it is senseless to employ the former term to discriminate between the relative
abilities of note thieves and check thieves to engender "holder" status in their transferees.
26 See White, supra note 1, at 1317-19, 1326-28.
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An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder
and on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto
as to become a part thereof.
This section establishes, at the very least, two necessary prerequisites
for a valid indorsement:" (1) it must be in writing and (2) it must
appear on the instrument or be affixed thereto. In the absence of either,
there can be no indorsement. The normative meaning of the remaining
language—"by or on behalf of the holder"—is less clear.
Commentators have interpreted the phrase, "by or on behalf of
the holder," as conditioning the validity of an indorsement upon the
holder status of the purported indorser." This construction would be
more plausible if the phrase were "by or on behalf of a holder." As
presently worded, section 3-202 (2) does not require the indorsement to
be made by a holder; rather, it merely presupposes that the instrument
is in the possession of a holder. This construction limits the imperative
("must") aspect of the section: it says nothing more than that if there
is a holder, then the indorsement must be made by him or on his behalf.
Except by way of negative pregnant, the phrase implies nothing for
the situation where the instrument is in the hands of a nonholder.
There is no judicial or secondary authority either accepting or
rejecting this construction of section 3-202(2). In fact, the courts have
just begun to discover the ambiguities latent in the provisions govern-
ing the creation and transfer of holder status." However, the validity of
the proposed construction need not rest on judicial authority alone.
By way of justification, the proposed construction of section 3-202(2)
can be shown to facilitate considerably the application of Article 3 in
cases involving negotiable instrument frauds.
In negotiable instrument frauds, one crucial issue is whether the
last transferee is a holder. As discussed above, a determination of a
party's status as holder must always commence with section 1-201(20)
and/or 3-202(1). Given this starting point, the direction and ease of
further analysis is governed by one's interpretation of the indorsement
requirements of section 3-202(2). Adoption of Professor White's in-
terpretation—that indorsement by a nonholder is ineffective for the
27
 These are the only two elements discussed in the Comments to U.C.C. § 3-202(2).
28 See, e.g., White, supra note 1, at 1327; Mellinkoff, supra note 1, at 192; Palizzi,
supra note 1, at 666.
29
 See Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81, 83-84
(1st Cir. 1970), aff'g 307 F. Supp. 648, 653-54 (D. Mass. 1969) (collecting bank as
holder in the absence of depositor's indorsement); Bowling Green: The Bank As A Holder
In Due Course, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 302, 308-11 (1971); Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28
(8th Cir. 1970) (receiver as holder); Estate of Kohlhepp v. Mason, 25 Utah 2d 155, 478
P.2d 339, (1970) (presentment by a nonholder under § 3-504(1)); Billingsley v. Kelly,
261 Md. 116, 274 A.2d 113 (Md. App. 1971) (constructive possession as sufficient for
holder status under I 1-201(20)).
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purpose of creating holder status in his transferee—necessitates an
examination of the holder status of successively prior transferors. As
a result, the holder status of the person who perpetrated the fraud must
eventually be determined. His status as a holder controls the validity
of the indorsement, which in turn controls the next transferee's holder
status, and so forth down the line. However, sections 1-201(20) and
3-202 (1) are difficult to apply with respect to impostors, false agents,
individuals who negotiate in breach of a duty, and parties in possession
of instruments payable to fictitious payees. 8°
The drafters of Article 3 obviously did not intend that the holder
status of an impostor, for example, should be determinative of the
holder status of the last transferee. Section 3-405(1) (a) makes effective
the impostor's indorsement without regard to his status as a holder. The
impostor provision is but one of a battery of "validation" provisions
which cure defective indorsements without regard to the holder con-
cept."
In order to make these validation provisions operative in any
given problem, it is necessary to reject Professor White's con-
struction of section 3-202(2). His contention that indorsement by a
nonholder is invalid makes holder status the sole determinative of the
effectiveness of an indorsement. The presence of the numerous valida-
tion provisions suggests that this construction of section 3-202(2) ig-
30 Consider, for instance, the holder status of an impostor. As the initial transferor
of the instrument he must acquire holder status, if at all, under § 1-201(20). Whether the
instrument will be viewed as having been drawn to the impostor's order will depend upon
whether the drawer's intention is deemed to be one of the aspects of drawing an instru-
ment. Reflections on this problem led the NIL drafters to view such an instrument
as bearer paper and led courts and commentators to distinguish between impostors who
confronted their victims personally and those who operated through the mails. See
W. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes §§ 140-46 (1st ed. 1943). The same
problems arise with respect to fictitious payee paper. The U.C.C. circumvents the
ambiguities latent in "drawing" and "order" by focusing strictly upon the effect of the
impostor's indorsement; see § 3-405 and the accompanying Official Comments. Or consider
the holder status of an agent who is authorized to negotiate instruments for his prin-
cipal's account. One day he indorses an instrument to his own order and negotiates to a
third party for his own account. Whether or not the faithless agent is a holder may
depend upon the effect of his indorsement to his own order. If the signature is unau-
thorized, it is wholly inoperative; it will not enable the agent to attain holder status
under § 1-201(20). However, since the authorized nature of the signature is, by force of
§ 1-201(43), made dependent upon questions of apparent and implied authority, there
is considerable room for debate concerning the agent's holder status, The U.C.C. avoids
these problems by focusing up6n the transaction as a whole, Under § 3-207(1)(d), a
negotiation in breach of duty is deemed effective.
al Other U.C.C. validation provisions are: § 3-207(1)(d) (negotiation in breach of
duty is effective); § 3-406 (negligence precludes assertion of unauthorized signature);
§ 3-413(3) (by drawing the drawer admits existence of the payee); § 3-405(1)(b), (c)
(indorsement in name of fictitious payee is effective); § 3-117 (an agent,.may, under
certain circumstances, act as a holder); § 3-203 (instrument payable to person under
misspelled or wrongly designated name may be indorsed in that name).
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nores the fundamental interrelationship between the holder concept and
the validation provisions. These provisions, not the holder in due course
doctrine, should, and do, function as the proper analogue to the good
faith purchaser doctrine which operates in connection with the transfer
of personal property.' Any "definition" of holder status or its con-
stituent elements must either make explicit reference to the validation
provisions or at least be phrased as a negative implication so as to
invite consideration and application of those provisions.
In order not to circumvent or short-circuit the applicability of the
validation provisions, it is necessary to adopt the proposed construction
of section 3-202(2): if the instrument is in the possession of a holder,
then indorsement must be made by him or on his behalf; if the instru-
ment is in the possession of a nonholder, then the nonholder's indorse-
ment will be invalid only in the absence of an applicable curative vali-
dation provision. Construed in this fashion, section 3-202(2) requires
that the initial consideration be not the holder status of the perpetrator
of the fraud, but rather, the applicability of one or more of the valida-
tion provisions. If there is no apposite validation section, then, and only
then, may the negative implication of section 3-202(2)—that indorse-
ment by a nonholder is invalid—be deemed dispositive.
Not suprisingly, Article 3 contains a norm which, under the here
hypothesized circumstances, may preclude reliance upon the negative
implication of section 3-202(2). That norm is found in section 3-207
(1) (d): "Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument although
the negotiation is ... made in breach of duty." Since Baker acquired the
instruments by theft, Able has a right to reclaim and Baker is under a
duty to return them.' Baker's release of possession and purported in-
dorsement to Donald constitute a breach of this duty.
Under section 3-207(1) (d) such a purported negotiation is, with-
out qualification, deemed effective. Under section 3-202(1) negotiation
is sufficient to make Donald a holder. Whether or riot section 3-207
(1) (d) also specifically validates Baker's indorsement is beside the
point. That section validates the entire negotiation without regard to
the validity of its constituent elements. The validated negotiation
82 Like U.C.C. § 2-403, which recognizes that a "person with voidable title has
power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value," the validation
provisions were conceived to cure title defects. The holder in due course doctrine, in
contrast, presupposes an absence of title defects. It operates mainly to cut off defenses
rather than claims.
83 it is this right and corresponding duty which forin the basis for the action of
conversion; see Restatement (Second) of Torts g 222A(I) (1965). There is nothing
explicit in ,either U.C.C. § 3-207 or its accompanying Comments to indicate that "breach
of duty" was meant (or not meant) to cover Baker's actions. However, Comments 2 and 3
do refer to negotiation by a thief. Although it is not specifically directed at any particular
subsection, that reference seems inappropriate in connection with any but the "breach of
duty" subsection.
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endows the transferee with holder status. The Comments to section
3-207 leave no doubt that the drafters intended the provision to encom-
pass attempted negotiations by a thief." Indeed, the language of the Of-
ficial Comment goes far beyond the herein proposed approach to holder
status. The Comment states: "It is inherent in the character of nego-
tiable paper that any person in possession of an instrument which by its
terms runs to him is a holder, and that anyone may deal with him as a
holder." Were that sentence the law, then regularity and possession
would be the sole prerequisites for holder status. Where those two
elements are present, as they are in the two notes described at the
outset of this section, there would be no necessity to analyze the holder
status of prior transferees.
Although the Official Comment probably represents an overstate-
ment or oversimplification, it does militate against any construction of
section 3-202 (2) which would make the holder status of a prior trans-
feree solely dispositive of the holder status of subsequent transferees.
The purport of the Comment, as well as the presence of the validation
provisions, indicates that in the case of either bearer or order paper the
holder status of the subsequent transferees does not invariably depend
upon the holder status of their predecessors. Indeed, the breadth of the
validation provisions suggested by section 3-207(1) (d) and the Official
Comment discloses a strong policy in favor of viewing possession and
regularity as the sole constituents of holder status. A comprehensive
examination of the cases involving negotiable instrument frauds would
perhaps reveal that most final transferees will be able to claim holder
status on the basis of regularity and possession because of the number
and breadth of the validation provisions. Professor White's approach
to section 3-202 (2)—far from representing the law governing defective
indorsements—may be so limited by the validation provisions that it
should be viewed as an exception to the rule that possession and regu-
larity are enough to create holder status.
The practical consequences of the proposed construction perhaps
best demonstrate its benefits. Section 3-207(1) (d) and the accompany-
ing Comments not only appear to obviate the need to predicate Donald's
holder status upon the holder status of his indorser (Baker the thief),
but also seem to avoid the definitional problems posed by sections
84 U.C.C. 9 3-207, Comment 2 states, in part:
It is inherent in the character of negotiable paper that any person in possession
of an instrument which by its terms runs to him is a holder, and that anyone
may deal with him as a bolder. The principle finds its most extreme application
in the well settled rule that a holder in due course may take the paper even from
a thief and be protected against the claim of the rightful owner.
See also §{} 3-603(1) (a) and.3-305, discussed supra at note 24, which recognize that thieves
may enjoy holder status. For a discussion of "delivery" as a prerequisite for the existence
of the maker's or drawer's contract, see W. Britton, supra note 30, at 9 50.
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1-201(20) and 3-202. Moreover, reference to this section produces
what is generally acknowledged to be the most proper allocation of
loss: with respect to the first and second instruments, Donald acquires
holder status and may invoke all the advantages incident thereto."
The first instrument, it will be remembered, was a bearer note. Like
cash, such paper contains no signature chain which enables a would-be
purchaser to discover defects in title. The purchaser relies solely upon
the promise of the maker, who should not be heard to invoke the very
title defects which he helped make possible. The second instrument was
payable to the order of the eventual thief. Theft of such instruments will
probably occur in the context of employment or other on-going relation-
ship between the maker and thief-payee." In these situations the
maker is in a position to prevent and detect such fraud. Requiring the
maker to suffer the loss under such circumstances conforms with the
policy of the Code which consistently precludes the drawer or maker
from invoking his employee's dishonesty to the detriment of subsequent
good faith purchasers of the instrument."
Finally, it never seemed quite appropriate to make the thief's
(Baker's) holder status determinative of Donald's holder status on the
first and second instruments. The significance of holder status lies
primarily in the fact that it provides a basis for reliance by third parties
who deal with the possessor of the instrument's In many instances, the
third party will be a court whose reliance on the status of the holder
will result in procedural advantage to the holder." In other situations,
a third-party transferee or discharger benefits from the legitimizing
effect that the holder status of the transferor has on certain of his acts."
The definition of holder must be formulated in light of these purposes.
88 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-301 (right to transfer, negotiate, discharge, or enforce);
3-302 (ability to qualify as holder in due course); 3-307(2) (procedural advantages);
3-603(1) (sentence 1) (discharge effect of payment to holder).
80 See, e.g., O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super. 517, 261
A.2d 722 (L. Div. 1970) (subcontractor stole note payable to his order from desk of
contractor and parties conceded that subsequent purchaser was holder in due course);
Pavilis v. Farmers Union Livestock Comm'n, 68 S.D. 96, 298 N.W. 732 (1941) (employee
steals blank but signed payroll checks); Sheffer v. Fleischer, 158 Mich. 270, 122 N.W.
543 (1909) (seller steals buyer's notes payable to seller while seller waits on another
customer) ; Salley v. Terrill, 95 Me. 553, 50 A. 896 (1901) (employee steals wage check
payable to himself); Dodd v. Dunne, 71 Wis. 578, 37 N.W. 430 (1888) (in the process of
closing a land deal, seller's attorney steals a commission note payable to self).
87 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-405(1)(c) (padded payroll provision); 3-406 and Comment
7; 3-407, Comment 3(a) (alteration by agent).
88 The reliance principle is most clearly articulated in U.C.C. f 3-207, Comment 2
(sentence I) quoted in note 34 supra.
80 See U.C.C. § 3-307(2) and Comment 2 which permit a holder, when a signature is
admitted or established, to recover on the instrument. For a detailed consideration of this
point see Kinyon, supra note 5, at 1447-554.
40 Under U.C.C. § 3-201 the "holder" status of a party legitimizes transfer, negotia-
tion, discharge and enforcement.
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The definition should set forth those factors deemed socially sufficient
to justify reliance by third parties. Among these factors, one necessary
element should be possession of the instrument. Another must be
regularity, i.e., that the words of the instrument are not inconsistent
with the possession. These two requirements are clearly included in
both the U.C.C. and NIL definitions of holder."
The crucial question is whether possession and regularity are
sufficient." If, as the Code seems to indicate, the significance of holder
status should be directed at forming a basis for third-party reliance,
then possession and regularity should suffice." In particular, as regards
the first and second notes, the status of the immediately prior deliverer
(Baker) is irrelevant: his status as holder or nonholder is generally
unascertainable by the would-be transferee (Donald), discharger or
enforcer and, therefore, is not material to the issue of reliance." In
short, the absence of a logical connection between the prior party's
holder status and the function served by the holder concept within
the framework of Article 3 graphically indicates that Baker's status as a
thief should not control Donald's status.
II. EFFECTS OF CONVERSION UPON THE HOLDER STATUS OF
SUBSEQUENT TRANSFEREES OF INSTRUMENTS CARRYING
FORGED INDORSEMENTS
At this point it might be argued that the proposed construction of
section 3-207 (1) (d) would operate to confer holder status upon
Donald in a third situation: where Baker steals an instrument payable
to Charles, forges Charles' indorsement, and negotiates it to Donald.
These acts certainly constitute a breach of duty. Without more, section
3-207 (1) (d) would imply that this attempted negotiation is also
effective. However, a specific provision precludes reliance upon section
3-207. Section 3-404(1) provides that:
Any authorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the
person whose name is signed . . . but it operates as the signa-
ture of the unauthorized signer . . . .
This norm requires that the name indorsed upon the third note be
U.C.C. { 1-201(20): " 'Holder' means a person who Is in possession of . . . [an
instrument] drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank."
NIL § 191: " 'Holder' means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession
of it, or the bearer thereof."
42 See W. Britton, supra note 30, at § 50 (delivery as condition precedent to existence
of the instrument contract). See also NIL § 16: "Every contract on a negotiable instru-
ment is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving
effect thereto."
4a This appears to accord with the intent of the Code's drafters; see U.C.C. § 3-207,
Comment 2, quoted at note 34 supra.
44 CI, W. Britton, supra note 30, at if 50-57.
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viewed not as that of Charles but as that of Baker." As a result, the
instrument is not treated as being regular on its face." If the third
instrument were indorsed in fact with the name of Baker, there would
be no reason to recognize any reliance interests on the part of Donald
or his transferees; they should and would be denied advantages inci-
dent to holder status.
However, the instrument is not indorsed with Baker's name but
rather with the purported signature of the payee, Charles. Under such
circumstances, there exists a distinct tension between sections 3 -404
and 3-207(1) (d). Indeed, without reference to the traditional law of
negotiable instruments, there is no way to determine which of the two
provisions is meant to govern the holder status of the transferee of the
third instrument.'" Regardless of whether the problem is viewed in
terms of the transferee's reliance interests or the maker's culpability
and expectation, there is no reason to distinguish between the trans-
feree's holder status on a note stolen by the payee and one on which the
thief forges the payee's name." A forged indorsement does lend the
appearance of regularity to the third instrument, and when the appear-
ance of regularity is coupled with the thief's possession, the transferee's
reliance is certainly justified." Where the forger's transferee (Donald)
negotiates the instrument to a good faith purchaser, these considera-
tions apply with even greater force. The imputed culpability of the
maker with respect to the forged instrument is not noticeably less
than it is in the case of the invalidly indorsed second instrument.
Instruments of either type frequently enter into circulation through
the dishonesty of an embezzling employee."
48 See U.C.C. § 3-404, Comment 2.
48 The term "regular" refers to the fact that the instrument, by its terms, runs to the
party in possession thereof. Regularity is a key element in determining holder status under
the Code. See U.C.C. 1 3-207, Comment 2, and text supra at note 34 et seq.
47
 On the one hand, U.C.C. 1 3-404 (inoperativeness of unauthorized signature) when
read in conjunction with I; 3-202(1) (indorsement as necessary element of negotiation;
negotiation as sufficient to create holder status) prevents a transferee from becoming a
holder over a forged indorsement. On the other hand, § 3-207(I)(d) (a negotiation is
effective although made in breach of duty—a thief who attempts to negotiate by way of
delivery and a forged indorsement has certainly breached a duty in respect to the payee)
when read in conjunction with 3-202(1) appears to validate the negotiation and thus
confer holder status on the transferee. This appears to be one of those situations where
"[i]n order to understand the UCC . . . you must first know the law of negotiable instru-
ments." Mellinkoff, supra note 1, at 192.
48 The second instrument, it will be recalled, was a note payable to Baker and stolen
by the payee; the third was a note payable to Charles and stolen by Baker.
" See U.C.C. § 3-207, Comment 2.
80 Compare the identity of parties who steal instruments of the second type (see
cases cited and summarized supra note 36) with the identity of parties who wrongfully
indorse and negotiate instruments of th6 third type in Prudential Ins. Co. of America
v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (forger unidentified);
Salsman v. Nat'l Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162 (1968) aff'd
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Nor can these compelling arguments be vitiated by contending
that the loss should be shifted onto the party who failed to know his
indorser,"' or that the maker has the right to receive the payee's in-
dorsement." Donald's request for identification from Baker would not
have revealed the defects in the transferor's title. With respect to the
instrument stolen by the payee, an identification inquiry would have
revealed only that the payee was indeed the presenting party. With
respect to the instrument on which the indorsement is forged, an
identification query would have been equally unavailing; the thief
(Baker) would have forged the payee's name either in blank or would
have forged a special indorsement by the payee to the order of Baker.
In either case, Baker comes to Donald with paper which is not only
regular on its face but whose defective indorsement cannot be discov-
ered by a routine request for Baker's identification.
The common law approach to unauthorized indorsements oc-
casionally appears in the form of the altogether conclusory statement
that the maker has the "right" to receive the payee's indorsement."
The Code version of this rule is, in effect, Professor White's interpreta-
tion of Section 3-202 (2): indorsement by a nonholder is ineffective to
endow the indorsee with holder status." Whatever the merits of this
interpretation, the Code elsewhere reduces the maker's right to a mere
expectation, if not to an evanescent fiction. The Code's validation
provisions—pursuant to which an unauthorized signature is declared
effective—are undisguised qualifications upon this "right."'" So numer-
ous and broad are these exceptions to the purported rule that the effect
without opinion, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (App. Div. 1969) (unauthorized signa-
ture by payee's agent); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 150 W. Va. 196,
144 S.E.2d 784 (1965) (indorsement forged by maker's agent); Allied Concord Financial
Corp. v. Bank of America, Nat'l T. & S. Ass'n, 275 C.A.2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (indorsement forged by payee's brother) ; Commonwealth v. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 46 Pa. D. & C.2d.141, 6 U.C.C. Rep. 369 (Ct. C.P. Dauphin County 1968)
(indorsement forged by maker's employee); Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass, 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962) (indorsement forged by maker's
agent) ; Starkey Constr., Inc. v. Elcon, Inc., 248 Ark. S.C.O. 958, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 923
(1970) (indorsement forged by to-payee) ; Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 211 Pa. Super. 42, 234 Aid 32 (1967) (indorsement forged by trusted friend
and former employee of maker).
51 Probably the most famous expression of this viewpoint appears in Mead v. Young,
4 T.R. 28 (K.B. 1790) (indorsement forged by person with same name as payee).
52 This consideration is used to distinguish the "impostor" cases from the "false
agency" cases; see Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Shapiro, 7 U.C.C. Rep. 317, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Nassau County 1970) ; cf. W. Britton, supra note 30, at § 147.
63 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 2.
64 This construction of U.C.C. § 3-202(2} produces the same results as the approach
which gives the maker a right to the payee's indorsement. Any Indorsement other than
one by the payee is unauthorized and thereby incapable of creating holder status in
subsequent transferees. Without holder status, the last transferee will be as completely
barred from recovery as if the maker had a "right to the payee's indorsement."
55 These validation provisions are set forth at note 32 supra.
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of any given fraudulent indorsement will, as likely as not, be governed
by one of the validation provisions as by the rule itself. 50 Under such
circumstances, it is equally sensible to state the law's approach to un-
authorized indorsements in terms of the "exceptions" to the rule. The
law governing unauthorized indorsements may be characterized, not
by the maker's right to his payee's indorsement, but rather by the
payment claim of a party in possession of a regular instrument."
III. THE HOLDER CONCEPT AND THE RISK OF ALTERATION
A third conundrum involving the holder concept arises in connec-
tion with altered instruments." Consider first a simple three-party
situation: Able draws an instrument payable to bearer, Baker steals
and raises the instrument from ten to ten thousand dollars and delivers
it to Donald. Alternatively, Able draws an instrument payable to the
order of Baker; Baker steals, raises, indorses in blank, and then de-
livers to Donald. If Donald is a holder in due course, he can enforce
both instruments against Able according to their original tenor." In
case of an incomplete instrument," or in case of negligence on Able's
part,°1
 Donald may be able to enforce the instrument according to its
altered tenor. Furthermore, under section 3-207(1)(d) Donald's
56
 See, e.g., Comment, Forgeries and Material Alterations: Allocation of Risks Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, SO B.U.L. Rev. 536, 543-51 (1971), in which one author
concludes that U.C.C. validation provisions (e.g., §§ 3-404, 3-405, 3-406, 3-407, and 4-406)
place considerably more risk on the drawer than pre-U.C.C. law.
57 This characterization resembles the position adopted by the Geneva Bills of
Exchange Act [art. 16(2)] and Geneva Check Act [art. 21]. For an excellent comparison
of the domestic and continental laws of negotiable instruments, see Kessler, Forged In-
dorsements, 47 Yale L.J. 863 (1938).
55 Cf. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1315,
1324 {1967) ; R. Speidel, R. Summers & J. White, Commercial Transactions Teaching
Materials 1063 (1969) ; Comment, Commercial Transactions: Can a Thief Be a "Holder"?
19 Okla. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1966).
59 U.C.C. § 3-407(3): "A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has
been completed, he may enforce it as completed."
eo See U.C.C. 3-407(3) ; Herdman v. First Nat'l City Bank, 3 U.C.C. Rep. 628
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1966) (drawer signed check but left payee's name blank;
thereafter check stolen, made payable to cash, and paid by defendant bank) ; Waterburg
Savings Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967) (plaintiff financing
bank not defeated by fact that consumer note given by defendant buyer to seller was
incomplete and completed by seller).
61 U.C.C. § 3-406. See Comment, supra note 56, at 547-49. For recent applications of
this section see Brower v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 311 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1 970)
Sam Goody, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 57 Misc. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Nassau County 1968) ; Wallach Sons, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 307 N.Y.S.2d 297, (Civ.
Ct., N.Y. County 1970). All three cases deal with acceptor banks' liability to good
faith holder of check raised after certification. In Sam Goody and Wallach Sons, the
courts find that § 3-413(1) ("acceptor engages to pay . . . according to tenor at time of
engagement") is dispositive in bank's favor. In Brower, the court invokes the possible
applicability of * 3-406 to deny the bank's motion for summary judgment.
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qualification as a holder in due course (in particular, his status as a
holder) is not necessarily affected by Baker's status as thief or con-
verter."
In this three-party situation, the holder status of the altering party
only becomes important if and when Donald does not qualify as a
holder in due course. In the latter event, Able's liability must then be
determined pursuant to section 3-407(2) :
As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due
course (a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent
and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby
changed... .
Commentators have construed this section to mean that alteration by
a nonholder will preclude the discharge effect of section 3-407(2) (a)."
They then invite participation in the vexing game of attempting to
determine whether Baker is a holder. They emphasize that it is desir-
able to view the thief as a nonholder in order to prevent discharge and
eventual unjust enrichment of Able." They, however, bemoan the
resulting contradiction: in connection , with stolen, but unaltered, in-
struments it is desirable to view the thieves as holders because of
indorsement problems, while, conversely, it is necessary to view the
thieves as nonholders with respect to stolen and unaltered instru-
ments." The dilemma is accentuated by the fact that the Code seem-
ingly acknowledges the possibility that a thief may be a holder."
One horn of this dilemma was removed in the foregoing discussion
which concluded that, with respect to certain stolen and unaltered
instruments, Donald's rights in no way depend upon the thief's status
as a holder.° The problem raised by the other horn of the dilemma
does require more consideration. This problem concerns the construc-
tion of section 3-407(2). Thus, even if one grants the correctness of
the current construction of section 3-407(2)—that alteration by a
nonholder precludes the discharge effect—it does not follow that, at
least in the simple three-party situation, it is desirable to view the
62 See text at notes 31-43 supra.
03 See White, supra note 58, at 1324; R. Speidel, R. Summers & J. White, Teaching
Notes 169 (1969); Comment, supra note 58, at 181.
04 See, e.g., White, supra note 58, at 1325-26. The unjust enrichment occurs
when Able is discharged not only from his liability as maker under § 3-413(1)
but, eventually, also from his liability on the underlying transaction pursuant to
§ 3-802(1) (b) ("discharge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges
him on the obligation").
03 See White, supra note 58, at 1325-26.
66 U.C.C. § 3-603(1), as well as § 3-207, Comment 2, expressly recognizes that a
thief may be a holder, while in § 3-305, there is an implied recognition of the same
possibility. See note 24 supra.
07 With respect to § 3-207(1) (d) see text at notes 34-43 supra,
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thief as a nonholder. Furthermore, the current construction of section
3-407(2) appears even more untenable once the analysis shifts to four-
party situations."
The effects of alteration in the three-party context become crucial
primarily in the absence of a holder in due course.°° Assume, for ex-
ample, that Donald does not qualify as holder in due course because
he had "reason to know"7° that the instrument had been altered?'
Under these circumstances, Baker's status as a holder seemingly de-
termines whether or not Able remains liable to Donald for the original
amount.72 If Baker is deemed a holder, section 3-407(2) (a) completely
discharges Able from any liability on the instrument. If, on the other
hand, Baker is deemed a nonholder, section 3-407(2) (b) applies and
the instrument may be enforced according to its original tenor.
In the absence of a purported negotiation under section 3-202(1)
Baker's status as a holder must be decided under section 1-201(20).
Although the latter section is somewhat ambiguous as applied to thieves
of bearer paper or paper payable to the thief, the most reasonable inter-
pretation results in the conferral of holder status on Baker." As
regards the present problem under section 3-407(2), this interpreta-
tion throws the loss onto Donald. Able is completely discharged on the
instrument. Nor is this result manifestly undesirable in light of the
fact that Donald has notice of the alteration.
The prevailing argument" against viewing the thief as a holder
derives from the "spoliation" doctrine" which finds some support in
the Official Comments to section 3-407:
A material alteration does not discharge any party unless it
is made by the holder. Spoliation by any meddling stranger
does not affect the rights of the holder."
The Comment, however, merely begs the issue: is the thief a holder
68 See text at notes 78-94 infra.
69 See text at note 59 supra.
70
 U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(c).
71 This is the most likely ground for denying holder in due course status because the
special paper used in printing checks and other instruments is designed to give subsequent
transferees' "visible evidence of alteration" in all but •those instances in which the
alteration is perpetrated by additional markings. U.C.C. § 3-304(1)(a).
72 White, supra note 58, at 1324-26.
78 .The ambiguity stems from the different meanings of "drawn" and "issued" and the
applicability of these terms to notes and checks. See text at notes 19-24 supra.
74 See White, supra note 58, at 1324 n.31.
75 For a general discussion of the "spoliation" doctrine, see W. Britton, Handbook
of the Law of Bills and Notes § 280 (1st ed. 1943). Apparently there have been no
"spoliation" cases decided under the U.C.C. Like the U.C.C., the NIL (§ 124) made no
explicit reference to the "spoliation" exception to the general rule governing the effects of
alteration.
76 U.C.C. 4 3-407, Comment 3(a).
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or a meddling stranger? To answer this question, one can look either
to the Code or to the case law arising under the spoliation doctrine. If
it is true that certain Code provisions grant holder status to thieves,
the result would be that Able is discharged on the note." Fortunately,
this tentative conclusion is not at odds with the traditional spoliation
doctrine.
Research of the spoliation cases reveals that they involve vari-
ations upon the following factual situation: X draws an instrument to
the order of Y and then delivers the instrument to Y in exchange for
a benefit (goods, money). When Y comes to enforce the instrument, X
discovers that it has been materially altered. The alteration is generally
attributed to an unknown party" or to unauthorized conduct on the
part of a servant of X7° or Y." X seeks to invoke the rule that any
such alteration discharges a party on the instrument whose contract
is thereby changed. This rule makes applicable the further rule that
discharge on the instrument entails discharge on the underlying obliga-
tion.' Motivated by the possibility of unjust enrichment in favor of
X,' the courts were quick to carve out the spoliation exception to the
basic norm governing the effects of material alteration." *
77 See text at notes 20-24 supra.
73 See Andrews v. Calloway, 50 Ark. 358, 7 S.W. 449 (1888) (unknown party inserts
words, "or bearer" in an originally non-negotiable note; held to be spoliation).
" See Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 530 ,(1855) (maker's financial agent, contrary
to instruction, affixes seal to a note; held to be spoliation); Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46,
52 P. 115 (1898) (maker executed a note and mortgage and employed an agent to sell
the paper; the agent raised the note; in suit against maker, alteration held to be spoliation).
80 Hunt v. Gray, 35 N.J.L. 227 (1871) (payee's agent added words, "or discount," to
note in order to make it acceptable to discounter; held to be spoliation); Presbury
v. Michael, 33 Mo. 542 (1863) (payee's financial agent adds interest clause to note; held
not to be spoliation in light of agent's authority). •
81 U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (b): "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken
for an underlying obligation . . . discharge of the underlying obligor on the instrument
also discharges him on the obligation."
82 See Hunt v. Gray, 35 N.J.L. 227 (1871) where payee's agent added wards "or
discount" to the note in order to make it acceptable to the discounter:
The defendant lbuyer-maker] in this case asks this court to decide that he may
keep the plaintiff's [seller-payee who first sold and then took up the note upon
nonpayment] horse without paying anything for him, because the agent of the
plaintiff, under an erroneous idea of his rights, made the alteration in question
. .. It is not often that a party can perpetrate a fraud by force of the gen-
erality of legal rules . . . ."
Id. at 234.
88 See Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 P. 115 (1898):
The general rule undoubtedly is ... that any material alteration in the contract
avoids it, even in the hands of innocent holders, and prevents recovery upon it
to any extent . . . tT]he rule does not apply in cases where the alteration is
by a stranger to the contract . . . . CS]uch an act by a stranger, without the
privity of the grantee or obligee, does not avoid the contract in its entirety .. .
but amounts to a spoliation merely, which will not prevent a recovery upon the
contract in accordance with its original terms, where those terms can be ascer-
17
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The spoliation doctrine is irrelevant to the three-party situation
where a thief alters bearer paper or paper drawn to his order. The
maker has received nothing of value upon parting with the instrument;
consequently, discharge will not enrich him unjustly. Moreover, since
by hypothesis Donald lacks holder in due course status (the spoliation
doctrine is only relevant under this assumption), the maker's discharge
coincides with Donald's lack of a meritorious reliance interest. Finally,
there is a good reason for viewing the spoliation doctrine as an agency
problem: i.e., to what extent may an obligee cite an agent's miscon-
duct as a ground for discharge with respect to an obligation which he
knowingly and willingly undertook." So viewed, the spoliation doctrine
has no application in a situation where the alteration is performed by
an individual who cannot be described as agent of any party to the
dispute. Since the doctrine contributes nothing to the proper interpre-
tation of the word "holder" in the present situation, all that remains
is the Code-oriented analysis which favors extending holder status to
the thief."
In the foregoing discussion, it was the presently prevailing con-
struction of section 3-407 (that alteration by a nonholder precludes the
discharge effect of 3-407 (2) (a)) which made necessary an examination
of the holder status of the thief." In the simple three-party situation,
the problems engendered by section 3-407 (2) (a) proved to be manage-
able, leading to defensible results. However, once additional parties
are introduced, the provisions of 3-407 become unwieldy and lead to
inconsistencies.
tamed . . . And an agent without authority is in this sense held to be a stranger
to the transaction . . . .
Id. at 53, 52 P. at 117.
84 The NIL provision (I 124) governing alteration explicitly acknowledged the
agency problem: "Where a negotiable instrument Is materially altered without the assent
of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party who has himself made,
authorized or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers" (emphasis added).
Under the U.C.C. the effects of agency relationships upon the consequences of alteration
are, in part, covered by 3-406 and in part are taken for granted; see I 3-407, Comment
3(a) which delimits the notion of "meddling stranger" in terms of agency law. The case
Iaw on "spoliation" consists largely of attempts to expand or contract the agency relation-
ships between the altering party and the parties to the note. In addition to cases cited
supra in notes 79 and 80, see Ruby v. Talbott, 5 N.M. 251, 21 P. 72 (1889) (payee
dissatisfied with form of note requests agent to procure new note from maker; instead,
agent allows maker to alter the first note; spoliation doctrine held not applicable) ; and
Bodine v. Berg, 82 N.J.L. 662, 82 A. 901 (N.J. Ct. Err. & A. 1912) (bank manager alters
note payable to bank):
ETThe question is whether, as to the nonconsenting obligor, the alteration by the
general manager of the bank was so foreign to his authority as to excuse the
bank from all responsibility in the matter, and to make the general manager a
stranger to the transaction.
Id. at 666, 82 A. at 903.
85 See text at notes 34-44 supra.
86 See text at notes 63-66 supra.
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Consider a typical four-party situation: Able draws an instru-
ment payable to Baker and delivers it to Baker; the latter indorses
to the order of Charles and delivers to Charles; Charles indorses in
blank; the instrument is stolen by a thief who raises and delivers it to
Donald. Assume, finally, that Donald gives values and acts in good
faith without notice of the conversion or alteration. Regardless of the
thief's status as a holder, Donald can enforce the instrument against
Able, Baker, or Charles according to its original tenor." Suppose that
Donald enforces the instrument against Charles. Charles' recourse
rights against Able (maker) and Baker (indorser) derive from the
contracts of the latter two parties: in the absence of any discharge,
both maker and prior indorser are liable to a subsequent indorser who
takes the instrument up." However, since Charles is a "prior" rather
than a "subsequent" holder in due course, he is potentially subject to
the discharge defense under section 3-407(2)(a).
Three solutions have been proposed. The first would construe the
thief as a nonholder whose alteration produces no discharge effect
pursuant to the current interpretation of section 3-407(2)." However,
this proposal conflicts with the results in the simple three-party situa-
tion described above," contradicts the Code's apparent grant of holder
status to some thieves," and is difficult to reconcile with the section
1-201(20) definition of holder as applied in cases involving stolen but
unaltered instruments."
A second solution, favored by Professor White, recognizes the
holder status of the thief but would avoid the discharge effect of sec-
tion 3-407(2)(a) on the basis of a subrogation theory." Under section
3-603(2), upon payment by Charles and surrender of the instrument to
him, Charles acquires the rights of a transferee." Pursuant to section
3-201(1), "the transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such
rights as, the transferor has therein." With respect to Able and Baker,
87 U.C.C. 3-407(3): "A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor . . . ."
88 U.C.C. 11§ 3-413(1) (liability of maker) and 3-414(1) (indorser's liability).
89 Cf. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1315,
1324-25 (1967).
00 See text at notes 69-85 supra.
91 U.C.C. 3-603(1)(a) explicitly recognizes and § 3-305 Implies that a thief may
enjoy holder status; see discussion note 24 supra.
02 See text at notes 34-43 supra.
93 White, supra note 89, at 1325 n.32, favors this solution.
94
 Under the U.C.C. this result must be derived by implication from I 3-603(2)
("Surrender of the instrument to [one who pays] gives him the rights of a transferee")
in conjunction with § 3-414(1) ("every indorser engages that . . . he will pay the
instrument . . . to any subsequent indorser who takes it up . . . ."). Compare the more
explicit formulation in NIL § 124.
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Charles would become a "subsequent holder in due course" and would
thus avoid the discharge effect of section 3-407(2) (a).
However, this proposal succeeds in precluding discharge and un-
just enrichment only in those cases where Donald qualifies as a sub-
sequent holder in due course. Where Donald "has reason to know" of
the alteration, the, subrogation theory will impose his notice upon an
indorser who takes up the instrument. The pre-alteration indorser who
reacquires the instrument presumbly can, at the very least, invoke his
former rights, i.e., enforce those obligations of prior parties arising
under sections 3-413 and 3-414. 95 However, these rights cannot, by
definition, give him subsequent holder in due course status for the
purpose of avoiding the discharge effect of section 3-407(2). Such
status must be derived from a subsequent holder by way of subroga-
tion. As a subrogee, the pre-alteration indorser who reacquires the
instrument can attain no better position than that occupied by his
subrogor." Hence, if the subsequent holder had notice of the alteration
and was, for that reason, precluded from the status of subsequent
holder in due course, it is difficult to perceive how the prior indorser
can acquire such holder status upon reacquisition of the instrument
from that party.
It is, of course, probable that under such circumstances Donald
will not succeed in obtaining payment from any indorser." This ig-
nores the fact that Charles may nevertheless want to enforce the
section 3-413(1) and section 3-414(1) contracts of Able or Baker."
However, so long as the thief is deemed a holder, Charles faces a
Hobson's choice of seeing Able and Baker discharged under section
3-407(2) (a), or inheriting Donald's notice under sections 3-603(2)
and 3-201(1)." Moreover, discharge on the instrument arguably
precludes recourse on the underlying obligation.'" That obligation
might be preserved by arguing that the instrument was not "taken for
05 This basic right of recourse is provided by U.C.C. § 3-413(2): "The drawer
engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dishonor or protest
he will pay the amount of the draft . . . to any indorser who takes it up" and by
§ 3-414(1): "every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary notice of
dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument . . . to any subsequent indorser who
takes it up."
00
 U.C.C. § 3-603(2) ("Surrender of the instrument to . . . [one who pays] gives
him the rights of a transferee") in conjunction with § 3-201(1) ("transfer of an instrument
vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has therein") produces this result.
07
 Due to his knowledge of the alteration, Donald will not qualify as a holder in due
course. U.C.C. §§ 3-302(1)(c), 3-304(1)(a).
08 Presumably Charles has given value (e.g. goods) for the instrument in reliance
upon' the maker's contract and his recourse rights against prior indorsers.
OD See notes 95-95 and text at note 88 supra.
700 See U.C.C.* 3-802(1) (b) (sentence 2) which states, in part, that "discharge of the
underlying obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obligation."
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[the] underlying obligation" 10' but was taken as security or mere
evidence of the obligation (emphasis added). However, this tenuous
argument provides an inadequate solution, insofar as it deprives
Charles of the procedural advantages of suing on the instrument.'"
Alternatively, one can argue that the thief is a nonholder, but this
contention again raises the very set of inconsistencies which should be
avoided."'
A third proposal would have the courts solve the recourse problem
in terms of the equitable doctrines of unjust enrichment and quasi-
contract, which are preserved by section 1-103. 16' For example, dis-
charge of Baker under section 3-407(2) (a) might, in light of section
3-802, prevent Charles from taking recourse against Baker on the
underlying obligation.105 However, there were no defects in either the
underlying obligation or in the instrument taken by Charles; nor did
the unenforceability of the obligation result from any culpability or
laches on his behalf. Accordingly, by analogy to the treatment of
benefits acquired under contracts subject to attack for illegality or
noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds,'" Charles should be able
to recover at least the value of the goods or services transferred to
Baker in exchange for the instrument. Indeed, the Code itself, by im-
posing an obligation of good faith in the performance and enforcement
of every contract within the scope of Section 1 -203, establishes the
basis for a very similar argument. This good faith obligation should
prevent Baker from invoking a discharge provision where the result
would be to leave Baker in retention of the benefit acquired through
the underlying sale or loan contract, even though the other party to
the contract committed no act which would justify such an unfair
result. Although workable, these suggestions should not be adopted
until it is well established that the Code, designed to regulate com-
mercial paper, does not indeed provide for the specific resolution of
rather straightforward recourse problems. 1°T
1 °1 U.C.C. § 3-802(1). Cf. W. Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes
§ 286 (1st ed. 1943).
102 Cf. U.C.C. I 3-307(2) and Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper: Holder's
Procedural Advantages Under Article Three, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1441, 1452-56 (1967).
108 See text at notes 89-92 supra.
104 See Comment, supra note 58, at 181-82.
1°6 U.C.C. § 3-802(1) (b): "[D]ischarge of the underlying obligor on the instrument
also discharges him on the obligation."
1°6 See Restatement of Restitution § 108(d) (1937) ; 2 A. Corbin, Contracts § 321
(1950).
1 °7 The U.C.C. drafters devoted considerable attention to recourse rights. For
example, the Code explicitly regulates the rights of one who pays over a forged indorse-
moot; under the prior law, this problem was dealt with in terms of restitution and unjust
enrichment. Compare U.C.C. § 3-417(1), 4-207(1) with NIL § 65 and Restatement of
Restitution 4 35 (1937). See also U.C.C. § 3-417, Comment 1.
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IV. REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 3-407(2)
The untoward effect of alteration upon recourse rights can be
overcome by reevaluating the source of the difficulty: the reference
to holder in section 3-407(2) (a). This section provides that "alteration
by the holder . . . discharges any party whose contract is changed .. ."
(emphasis added). Before the effect of the alteration defense can be
assessed, one must first identify the referent of the term, "the holder."
To avoid the rigors of circular definitions, identification should be made
in the inviting context of a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to recover
on the instrument."' Such a suit will be framed and prosecuted in
accordance with section 3-307(2), which permits recovery upon the
production of an instrument containing admitted or established signa-
tures.'" A prerequisite of that section is that the party seeking recovery
be a holder. In the context of a recovery action based on Section 3-307
(2), the Code and judicial interpretations leave no doubt that the
holder prerequisite requires the moving party to be in possession of
the instrument.'"
Once the plaintiff has established holder status and the other
four elements of his case under section 3-307(2)," 1 the burden shifts
to the defendant on the last element of that provision, i.e., the matter
of defenses."2
 The defendant will then invoke the alteration defense
under section 3-407(2). To succeed, the defendant must demonstrate
the existence of an alteration by the holder. However, in the context
of the recovery action under section 3-307(2), "holder" refers, if to
anyone at all, to the plaintiff. Consistency alone would seemingly
require that the correct referent for "holder" as used in section 3-407
(2) (a), should also be, if anyone, the plaintiff himself. On its face
this suggestion is not too unreasonable. Holder status is a quality
1°8 The possibility of becoming ensnared in circular definitions is well illustrated by
E. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation 76-78 (1967) and M. Cohen & E. Nagel, An Intro-
duction to Logic and Scientific Method 223-43 (1934).
108 See Kinyon, supra note 102, at 1452-56.
111) U.C.C. 3-307, Comment 2: "The provision [I 3-307(2)] applies only to a holder,
as defined in this Act (Section 1-201)." U.C.C. 1-201(20) makes possession a necessary
element of "holder" status. See also Rago v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 89 Ill. App. 2d 12,
232 N.E.2d 88 (1967) where the court stated, in part: "the mere possession and production
into evidence . . . entitles that holder to a prima fade basis for recovery . . ." Id. at
19, 232 N.E.2d at 93.
111 U.C.C.	 3-307(2) may be broken up into six distinct elements: "When [1]
signatures are [2] admitted or established, [3] production of [4) the instrument entitles
[5] a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes [6] a defense" (emphasis
added).
112 See U.C.C. 3-307, Comment 2; Northside Bank v. Investors Acceptance Corp.,
278 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Factors and Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc.,
102 N.J. Super. 43, 245 A.2d 223 (L. Div. 1968).
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whose main element is possession, and which, therefore, must follow
the instrument."'
This proposed. reinterpretation avoids all the inconsistencies
engendered by the prevailing construction of section 3-407(2). 1" In
the three-party situation, Able drew an instrument payable to bearer
or to Baker's order and Baker proceeded to steal, raise, and negotiate
the instrument to Donald. In the resulting suit by Donald against
Able, the current construction of section 3-407(2) required that the
holder status of the thief be determined as the effective basis for dis-
charge, at least in those cases where Donald was not a subsequent
holder in due course."' Certain Code provisions implied that Baker
should be viewed as a holder.' Although this implication did suffi-
cient justice to the interests involved and comported with other
provisions of the Code, it did not follow ineluctably from the Code
provisions defining holder.'"
In contrast, the proposed interpretation leads immediately and
unambiguously to the desired result. It permits Donald to repulse the
section 3-407(2) (a) defense by merely pointing out that the alteration
was not made by "the holder"—who, at the present time, is Donald
himself—but rather by Baker who is no longer a holder. Consequently,
Able's liability under the contract provisions of either section 3-414
or 3-413 remains alive. Recovery will depend not upon the sterile
riddle of determining the thief's holder status, but upon whether
Donald had sufficient notice. 118
With respect to multi-party situations involving recourse liability,
the proposed solution also avoids the problems engendered by the
current construction of section 3-407(2).118
 Here Able drew an instru-
ment payable to Baker and delivered it to him; Baker then indorsed
the instrument specially and delivered it to Charles; Charles indorsed
in blank, and a thief then stole the instrument and delivered it to
118 At any one point in time, only one person will qualify as the holder of the
instrument. U.C.C. § 1-201(20). However, there exist a number of prior transferees who
once enjoyed this status. Frequently, this prior status is significant in the Code; at other
times, the drafters were concerned primarily with the party presently in possession of
the instrument. Occasionally, this distinction is made explicit by use of the expressions,
"a holder" and "the holder." Compare the meaning of "a holder" in §§ 3-202(1), 3-417(2)
(preamble), 3-603(1), 3-604(1) with the purport of "the holder" in I§ 3-202(2), 3-301,
3-412(1), 3-413(2), 3-414(1), 3-501(1)(a), 3-506(1), 3-063(1), 3-604(2).
114 See text at notes 88-107 supra.
iis See text at notes 63-65 supra.
116 See note 91 supra.
117 Due primarily to ambiguities in the meanings of "drawn" and "issued" as used
in U.C.C. § 1-201(20) ; see text at notes 19-24 supra.
119 Donald will have to qualify as a subsequent holder in due course (U.C.C.
§ 3-407(3)) or prove negligence or ratification on the part of Able (U.C.C. § 3-406).
119 See text at notes 93-107 supra.
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Donald for value. If Donald is a subsequent holder in due course, he
can recover according to the original tenor regardless of the thief's
holder status.'
When Donald as a subsequent holder in due course can recover
the original amount from Charles, Charles then must seek recourse
against Baker. Under the current interprdtation of section 3-407(2),
the recourse liability of Baker and Able with respect to Charles is
dependent upon whether or not the thief qualifies as a holder. Only if
the thief is deemed a nonholder does this recourse liability always
survive."' If the thief is deemed a holder, as the Code seems to re-
quire,122 the recourse rights will persist only by way of subrogation
and then only in the event that Donald is a subsequent holder in due
course."
In this situation the proposed interpretation permits the court to
avoid considering the status of the thief. Charles would be able to
overcome Baker's invocation of section 3-407(2) (a) by pointing out
that the alteration had not been performed by the holder, presently
identified as Charles himself. Baker's chances to escape recovery on
the instrument would depend upon proof of defects in the Baker-
Charles transaction.' To escape recovery by Charles, Able would have
to show that Charles was not a holder in due course. It seems prefer-
able that recovery be controlled by these issues rather than by the
holder status of the thief, or by the good faith or notice of a subse-
quent transferee. This approach comports with the well defined Code
policy that, as between two parties to a transaction, one party's claim on
an accompanying instrument cannot be severed from the defenses origin-
ating in the underlying obligation. 125 Moreover, other subsequent
defects—e.g., fraud, failure of consideration, incapacity, or theft—
have no effect upon the action by one prior indorser against another.
There is no apparent reason to make an exception for the case of
subsequent alteration. The obligation of the prior parties should be
determined only by the current events which they control and, to a
lesser extent, by prior events which they can discover.
The question arises, however, whether the result should be any
120 U.C.C. § 3-407(3).
121 See text at notes 89-92 supra.
122 See note 117 supra.
128 See text at notes 93-103 supra.
124 Since Baker and Charles presumably "dealt with" one another, Charles would
'not take the instrument free of defects in the underlying transaction even though he might
conceivably qualify as a holder in due course with respect to Baker.
125 This is the impact of the "dealt with" limitation upon the holder in due course
doctrine: "To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course be takes the instrument
free from . . .• (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom he hasc not
dealt . . ." (emphasis added). U.C.C. § 3-305(2).
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different where Donald had notice of the alteration and was unable to
recover the original amount from Charles. Under the current interpre-
tation of section 3-407(2) (a), Charles' rights on the instrument are
frustrated primarily by the fact that the holder status of the thief is
dispositive. If the thief is viewed as a holder, the alteration discharges
Able except with respect to subsequent holders in due course.'" Al-
though a prior indorser such as Charles can qualify as a subsequent
holder in due course by way of subrogation, this remedy is unavailable
when his potential subrogor has notice of the defect."' If the thief is
deemed a nonholder, Able is not discharged with respect to Charles.
However, this simple expedient is foreclosed by other Code provisions
which require that the thief of such an instrument be treated as a
holder.'" Under the present proposal, Charles would encounter none
of these difficulties. In a suit against Able or Baker, Charles could
avoid the section 3-407(2) defense by arguing that the alteration had
not been performed by the holder, who is Charles himself. The con-
tract liability of Able and Baker would remain alive and would permit
recovery unless Able could show that Charles is not a holder in due
course, or unless Baker could invoke a defect in the Baker-Charles
transaction.
It may be argued that the proposed solution robs section 3-407(2)
of almost all normative content: the "holder" element becomes oper-
ative only if the plaintiff is the same person who altered the instrument.
Far from being a criticism, this objection accurately describes the main
virtue of the proposed interpretation. In the context of a recovery
action under section 3-307(2), the alteration defense may, by the very
nature of things, be raised only with respect to three possible parties:
the altering party, a party who took the instrument before alteration,
or one who took subsequent thereto. If the subsequent takers are
holders in due course, section 3-407(3) recognizes their rights irrespec-
tive of the holder status of the thief and permits them to enforce the
instrument. If the subsequent taker is not a holder in due course, then
his rights as to the original amount should be controlled by the reasons
for this failure to so qualify. Investigation of the holder status of the
thief is superfluous.
The alteration is equally irrelevant with respect to the rights and
obligations of prior takers. By definition, they had no notice of the
alteration when they entered into their section 3-414 contract. It is a
tortured reading of the Code to condition their rights inter se upon a
subsequent event over which they had no control. By analogy to the
220 See text at notes 89-92 supra.
121 See text at notes 93-103 supra.
128 U.C.C. § 3-603 expressly indicates, and § 3-305 implies, that thieves may enjoy
holder status.
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case of lost instruments, they should be able to sue prior parties upon
proof of the original tenor. 12° Their obligations vis-à-vis subsequent
takers cannot be viewed differently from the rights of these latter
parties over prior takers. Such rights should be governed by the holder's
compliance with the elements of due course acquisition. 18°
Consequently, as regards the majority of individuals involved-
i.e., the prior and subsequent takers of the instrument—their recovery
claims under section 3-307(2) may be resolved without reference to
the holder status of the thief. The determinative factors should be
(a) qualification as a holder in due course and (b) position with respect
to the alteration, i.e., prior or subsequent taker. However, under the
current construction of section 3-407(2) (a), these issues are not
necessarily reached. The defendant may free himself from liability on
the grounds that the alteration was perpetrated by a holder other than
the plaintiff. 131 In contrast, the proposed interpretation of section
3-407(2) preserves the contract obligations under section 3-413 and
3-414. Discharge results if, and only if, the alteration was performed by
the holder who, in a 3-307(2) recovery action, is generally the plaintiff.
If either prior or subsequent holders sue under section 3-307(2), the
defendant will be able to claim that the alteration was performed by
the holder. Consequently, his contract liability will be preserved and
recovery will depend upon consideration of notice, good faith, and
negligence.
When the altering party, rather than a prior or subsequent holder,
appears as a plaintiff in the section 3-307(2) action, there exists good
reason for adopting a different approach. If the alteration was material
and fraudulent, there is no need to proceed to investigations concerning
notice and good faith: the plaintiff, as altering party, may be presumed
to have notice.'" In this situation, the defendant's contract obligations
under section 3-413 or 3-414 need not be preserved. Again, the proposed
interpretation produces just this result. If the alteration is performed
by the holder, who in the context of section 3-307(2) is the plaintiff,
then the discharge defense is available to any party, providing that
the alteration was material and fraudulent and that it changed that
party's contract.
As the Official Comments to section 3-407 make clear, the dis-
129 U.C.C. § 3-804: "The owner of an instrument which is lost ... may maintain
an action in his own name and recover from any party liable thereon upon due proof of his
ownership, the facts which prevent his production of the instrument and its terms." For a
discussion of the difficulties arising under this section, see White, Some Petty Complaints
About Article Three, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1315, 1333-38 (1967).
139 See text at notes 119-25 supra.
131 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-407(2)(a).
132 He would then be "a party to . . . [a] fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment." U.C.C. 1 3-201(1).
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charge effect also comes into operation when the alteration was per-
formed, not by the plaintiff under section 3-307(2), but by one of his
agents or servants.'" In the latter case, the initial concern is whether
to ascribe the alteration to the plaintiff.'" Once the alteration is
attached to him, immediate discharge is justified since the plaintiff
has constructive notice.'" If the servant's alteration cannot be at-
tributed to the plaintiff, then we no longer have a case where the
alteration was performed by the plaintiff holder. The proposed
interpretation would preserve the defendant's contractual liability and
thus would properly open the way to deliberations concerning his
notice and good faith.
V. DOUBLE FORGERIES AND HOLDER STATUS OF TRANSFEREES
The final conundrum arises in a situation"' in which an employee,
Baker, steals blank checks and a signature verification device from his
employer, Able. Baker then draws a check to the order of Charles, a
fictitious payee, and ultimately negotiates the checks to Donald by
delivering them and indorsing Charles' name. Donald gives value and
receives the instruments in good faith and without notice. When
Donald sues Able on the instrument, Able will certainly invoke section
3-404(1) which declares an unauthorized signature to be wholly in-
operative."' In reply, Donald will point to Baker's access to the
verification device and invoke section 3-406:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes
. . . to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded
from asserting the . . . lack of authority against a holder in
due course or against a drawee or other payor . . . .
However, Donald's reliance upon section 3-406 requires that he prove
himself to be a holder in due course, for he certainly cannot qualify
as a "drawee" or "other payor."
Here, again, the thief's indorsement threatens to preclude Donald
from acquiring holder status. Donald must qualify for holder status
either by way of section 1-201(20), by possessing an instrument in-
dorsed to him or his order, or by way of section 3-202(1), which
confers holder status on the transferee if the delivery and indorsement
requirements of negotiation have been observed. Under the prevailing
183 See U.C.C. 13-407, Comment 3(a).
184 Agency considerations dominated the pre-Code case law regarding the "spoliation"
doctrine: see text at notes 83-85 supra and especially authorities cited in note 84.
133 See text at note 132 supra.
130 See, e.g., Palizzi, Forgeries and Double Forgeries Under Articles 3 and 4 of the
UCC, 42 S. Cal. L. Rev. 659, 660 (1969) for a discussion of this conundrum.
137 " 'Unauthorized' signature or indorsement means one made without actual, implied
or apparent authority and includes a forgery." U.C.C. II 1-201(43).
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construction of section 3-202(2), an indorsement must be made by a
holder in order to be operative. 188 Thus, Donald's holder status, and
his chances successfully to invoke section 3-406, depend upon the
holder status of the thief.
In the absence of any negotiation to Baker, section 3-202(1) is
inapplicable and Baker's holder status depends solely upon whether
or not he qualifies under section 1-201(20). However, Baker fails to
fall within the literal scope of that broad provision. 139 Although the in-
strument was "drawn," it was not drawn to him or to his order or in
blank.'" Although he is in possession of an instrument, that instrument
was not "issued" for issuance presupposes an element of delivery. 141
Finally, in the absence of a prior transferee, it is doubtful whether the
check was ever "indorsed" to Baker. Consequently, under the pre-
vailing construction of section 3-202(2), Baker's inability to qualify
for holder status vitiates the indorsement to Donald, prevents the
latter from achieving holder status, and thereby obstructs the ap-
plicability of section 3-406. Yet, it is unlikely that the drafters in-
tended Donald to bear the loss if Able was in fact negligent in safe-
guarding the signature verification device. 142
Professor Palizzi advances several proposals to remedy this situ-
ation which, although they produce the proper allocation of loss, are
unsatisfactory in some other respects. First, Baker's use of a fictitious
payee is not unlike the case where he used his own name as payee. Had
he used his own name, Baker would have been in possession of an
instrument "drawn" to his order, hence qualifying him as a "holder"
(under section 1-201(20)) who could produce a valid indorsement
under section 3-202(2). His indorsee would then qualify as a holder
and, eventually, also as a holder in due course for the purpose of
invoking section 3-406 against the careless employer. Professor Palizzi
argues that, by analogy, the same result should follow where the faith-
less employee draws the check to a fictitious payee. It is, in his view,
artificial to condition access to section 3-406 upon the whim of the
188 U.C.C. § 3-202(2): "An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the
bolder and on the instrument . . . ." See White, Some Petty Complaints About Article
Three, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1315, 1327 (1967); Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 77 Yale L.J. 185, 192 (1967); Palizzi, supra note 136, at 666 (1969);
James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky Associates, Inc. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. 1134 (1956).
189 U.C.C. § 1-201(20): "Holder means a person who is in possession of .. . an
instrument . . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank."
149 Cf. NIL 1 9(3): "The instrument is payable to bearer—when it is payable to the
order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making
it so payable." The drafters of the U.C.C. explicitly rejected this rule; see U.C.C.
3-405, Comment 1.
141 U.C.C. fl 3-102(1)(a), 1-201(14).
142 See U.C.C. 0 3-406, Comment 7 (sentence 2).
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faithless employee.148 However, Baker did in fact draw the instrument
to a fictitious payee. Unless the meaning of "draw" and "order" in
section 1-201(20) is contorted, it is difficult to view the resulting
instrument as one payable to Baker or to his order or to bearer or
in blank.'"
It is in the nature of most statutory schemes that the dictates of
specific statutory language cannot be overcome through argument by
analogy. Moreover, as regards the availability of relief under section
3-406, it is not necessarily capricious to distinguish between transferees
of fictitious payee checks and transferees of checks payable to the
faithless employee. In practice, checks are not treated as negotiable
paper; 148 they are generally deposited by the payee for collection.
Payroll checks are, by way of exception, occasionally negotiated once,
often to a grocer or check-cashing service, and then deposited for
collection. The party who gives the faithless employee value for the
fictitious payee check is not acting in accordance with this common
business custom. Even assuming that the item has the appearance of
a payroll check, the fictitious payee check purports on its face to have
already been negotiated from the fictitious payee to Baker. In contrast,
the party who gives the employee value for the check, payable to the
employee's order, is acting in accordance with the custom which
permits a single negotiation of a payroll check.
Professor Palizzi's second proposal seeks to establish Donald's
holder status by reference to section 3-405(1) (b):' 4°
An indorsement by any person in the name of a named
	 •
payee is effective if . • (b) a person signing as or on behalf
of a maker or drawer intends the payee to have no interest
in the instrument.
If applicable, this section would make effective Baker's indorsement
to Donald and would enable the latter to qualify for holder status
under either section 1-201(20) or 3-202(1). 1" Although the case
falls within the literal language of section 3-405(1) (b), the provision
presupposes a drawer who, in contrast to Baker, is actually authorized
to sign the drawer's name.'" Finally, Professor Palizzi suggests that,
for purposes of section 3-406, holder in due course should be read as
143 See Palizzi, supra note 136, at 668-69.
144 As regards the difficulties in applying U.C.C. § 1-201(20) to instruments payable
to fictitious payees, payees without an interest, and agents without authority, see discussion
at note 30 supra.
146 See Rosenthal, Negotiability—Who Needs It? 71 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 382 (1971).
146 See Palizzi, supra note 136, at 669-70.
147 Both sections presuppose a valid indorsement as an element of holder status.
148 See U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 3 (d)-(g) ; Palizzi, supra note 136, at 670.
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transferee in due course.'" However, in light of the distinction between
transferee and holder throughout Article 3, 150 such a proposal repre-
sents a significant incursion upon the statutory language.'" It would
be far less objectionable to resolve the difficulties by reference to
section 3-405 (1) (b) since the facts fall within the literal meaning, as
well as the broader intention, of that provision.'"
Although Professor Palizzi's proposals will permit the loss to be
shifted onto Able, they fail—as does Professor White's analysis of
the effects of conversion on the holder status of subsequent transferees
—to respond to the underlying problem. That problem, once again,
is the proper construction of the requirement of section 3-202 (2)
linking an indorsement with holder status. The puzzles discussed by
Professors Palizzi and White are largely of their own making.
Both commentators, without further discussion, embrace an inter-
pretation of section 3-202 (2) which predicates an indorsee's holder
status upon the holder status of his indorser.'" As a matter of statu-
tory construction, this interpretation is at best tenuous: it is based
solely on a negative implication' which is repeatedly contradicted by
other Article 3 provisions.
With respect to the present problem, the negative implication is
indirectly controverted by sections 3-305 and 3-603(1) both of which
140 See Palizzi, supra note 136, at 670-71.
150
 The distinction appears most clearly in the following series of provisions: "Trans-
fer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has therein . ."
U.C.C. 3-201(1). "Negotiation takes effect only when the indorsement is made . . . ."
U.C.C. § 3-201(3). "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the
transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by
delivery with any necessary indorsement . . . ." { 3-202(1).
151
 "Transfer" refers to the beneficial interests in the instrument whereas "holder"
refers to right to transfer, enforce, or discharge the instrument; see U.C.C. § 3-301. As is
the case in the collection process, holder status may be in one party and ownership rights
in another; see U.C.C. § 4-201(1).
152 Section 3-405(1) (b) nowhere explicitly requires that the drawer of the fictitious
payee instruments be authorized to draw on the account; the section refers only to "the
person signing as or on behalf of the maker or drawer" (emphasis added). Nor is any such
limitation contained in the first three examples provided to illustrate the operation of the
section: "The drawer of a check, for his own reasons, makes it payable to P knowing
that P does not exist." U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 3(a). The admitted policy of the
fictitious-payee provisions is to shift the loss to the party (here, the employer) who is in
a superior position to prevent the Ioss, who is better able to cover the loss by fidelity
insurance, and with respect to whom the loss may be most properly regarded as an
expense of doing business. U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 4. In the face of this policy and the
lack of an explicit restriction, it seems somewhat strained to distinguish between an em-
ployee who writes fictitious payee checks within the apparent scope of his authority (i.e.,
a payroll clerk) and an employee who is able to write fictitious payee checks by virtue of
his access to a signature verification device (i.e., the personal secretary of a corporate
officer).
153 See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
154 See text at notes 27-34 supra.
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indicate that Baker's role as a thief does not necessarily preclude
Donald from acquiring holder status."' Sections 3-203, 3-207(1) (d)
and 3-405(1) (b) go further and explicitly contradict this implication.
Where an instrument is made payable to a person under a name other
than his own, section 3-203 permits indorsement in that name. Al-
though this provision probably contemplates wrongly designated or
misspelled names, neither the statutory language nor the Official Com-
ments specifically restrict the operation of the provision to such cases.
The present facts fall within the literal scope of the section. Where the
faithless employee (Baker) draws the instrument to a fictitious payee,
he comes to Donald with an instrument "made payable to a person
under a . . . name . . . other than his own." 180 Section 3-203 recognizes
an indorsement in that name or Baker's own name. The indorsement
provides the basis for Donald's holder status. Section 3-207(1) (d)
deems effective a negotiation made in breach of duty."' The actions
of the faithless employee in using the blank checks and signature
verification device certainly represent a breach of duty to his em-
ployer. If this breach of duty may be subsumed under section 3-207
(1) (d), and neither the provision nor the Comments contain any
limiting language, then the negotiation to Donald will be deemed
effective. Under section 3-202 (1) the negotiation will provide a basis
for Donald's holder status. As discussed above, the facts fall within
the literal language as well as the policy scope of section 3-405(1) (b),
which renders effective an indorsement upon fictitious payee paper. 168
The effective indorsement will enable Donald to qualify for holder
status and thus, eventually, to invoke section 3-406 against the care-
less employer.
It will be argued that application of those provisions to the
present facts goes far beyond the drafters' intent. However, as an
examination of each provision demonstrated, neither the statutory
language nor the comments preclude their application in the present
circumstances. In the absence of some explicit manifestation of legis-
lative intent, it seems fair to regard the scope of the provisions as an
open question, pending a judicial interpretation. Indeed, one may even
argue that the presence of so many potentially broad validation pro-
visions indicates a general legislative policy in favor of viewing
155 See discussion at note 128 supra.
150 "Where an instrument is made payable to a person under a misspelled name or
one other than his own he may indorse in that name or his own or both . . . ." U.C.C.
13-203.
167 "Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument although the negotiation is .. .
(d) made in breach of duty." U.C.C. 3-207(1) (d). Neither the statute nor the Comments
impose any restriction upon the term "breach of duty."
158 See note 152 supra.
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possession and regularity as the sole constituents of holder status.'"
As argued elsewhere, any additional requirements defeat the reliance
function served by holder status within Article 3 180 and inevitably
encroach upon the operation of other key notions such as due course,
notice and good faith."' These considerations rather conclusively
suffice to deprive the negative implication contained in section 3-202
(2) of any normative significance whatsoever. For those unwilling to
go so far, the language and intention of section 3-405(1) (b), and the
analogy to the case where the thief (Baker) uses his own name as
payee,'" are sufficient to overcome the negative implication of section
3-202(2) as it operates in the double forgery puzzle.
CONCLUSION
The significance of the holder concept has been grossly over-
emphasized. The result has been a number of inconsistencies which
appear to strike at the very heart of the "Article Three machine."'"
The most important conundrums—negotiation by a thief, double
forgeries by a thief, and the significance of alteration by a nonholder
—all result from a predisposition to elevate negative implications into
positive norms. In the case involving negotiation by a thief, reliance
upon the negative implication of section 3-202(2) is precluded by
the explicit provision to the contrary contained in section 3-207(1) (d),
which permits negotiation by nonholders. As it appears in the double
forgery puzzle, the negative implication of section 3-202(2) is also
overcome by the language and intention of sections 3-405, 3-203,
3-207 and 1-201(20). The additional problems raised by the negative
implication contained in 3-407(2) result from a misreading of 3-407
(2) (a). Within the context of a recovery action under section 3-307
(2), "the holder" should be properly read as referring only to the
plaintiff. The only time discharge under section 3-407(2)(a) is
desirable is when the plaintiff or his servant has performed the altera-
tion: Otherwise, the defendant's contractual liability under section
3-413 or section 3-414 should be preserved in order that the issue of
notice and good faith become dispositive of the dispute. The interpre-
tations proposed in this article would provide a measure of consistency.
159 See notes 34-35 supra, and accompanying text.
180 See text at notes 38-44 supra.
1s1 Expansion of the holder concept to include more than regularity and possession
leads to discharge for want of a valid indorsement (U.C.C. § 3-702(7)), discharge for
spoliation (U.C.C. § 3-407(2)(a)), and discharge for inability to invoke the maker's negli-
gence (U.C.C. § 3-406) ; one does not reach the issues of notice, good faith, and negligence.
In contrast, these issues are preserved if "holder" is defined strictly in terms of possession
and regularity.
162 See text at notes 142-45 supra.
183 See White, supra note 138, at 1315.
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More importantly, they would shift the focus of analysis from the
relatively sterile holder concept to the more fertile elements of the
holder in due course doctrine. 18"
164 To the extent that the holder concept is construed to entail anything more than
regularity and possession, it comes to resemble the notion of title. The functional disutility
of the title concept in a commercial setting is evidenced by the drafters' total rejection of
that concept in framing the rights and duties of parties under Articles 2 and 9; see U.C.C.
11 2-401 (preamble) and 9-202.
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